1980, 67 – 106.
679
См.: S. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, D. Davidson, G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972, 253 – 355.
680
R. Boyd, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 82 – 83.
681
S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
682
См.: R. Boyd, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 84.
683
Заметим, что не только тождество токенов может не предполагать тождество типов, но и тождество типов, предположительно, может не иметь своим необходимым следствием тождество всех релевантных токенов.
684
D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 79 – 101.
685
См. обсуждение различных концепций не редуктивной зависимости в: Brian P. McLaughlin, ‘Varieties of supervenience’, Savellos and Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
686
D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 87.
687
См.: Н. Гудмен, «Факт, фантазия и предсказание», Н. Гудмен, Способы создания миров, М. Праксис, 2001, 90 (и далее).
688
D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, L. Foster, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 90 – 91.
689
R. Boyd, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 87 – 88.
690
Там же, 94.
691
См. там же: 99 – 100.
692
Там же, 101.
693
См.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.
694
G. Mandler, ‘Consciousness: Respectable, Useful, and Probably Necessary’, R. Solso (ed.), Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium, Hillsdale: Erlbaum Press, 1975, 229.
695
Ср.: G. Guzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Guzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 17.
696
T. Shallice, ‘Dual Funсtions of Consciousness’, The Psychological Review, 79:5, 1972, 383 – 393.
697
См.: G. Guzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Guzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 18.
698
D. Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63, 1, 1966, 166.
699
D. M. Armstrong, ‘The Causal Theory of the Mind’, Neue Heft fur Philosophie, no. 11, 1977, 88.
700
См.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 175 – 177.
701
Там же, 177 и далее.
702
D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 1972, 249 – 258.
703
D. Lewis, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 216 – 222.
704
D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 208 – 209.
705
D. Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’, C. V. Brost (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, London, Macmillan, 1970, 67 – 79.
706
В: H. Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, 37 – 48.
707
Jaegwon Kim, ‘Physicalism and the Multiple Realisability of Mental States’, “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory”, Monist 56, no. 2, 1972, 177 – 192.
708
N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325.
709
S. Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, 291 – 315.
710
Критик может счесть не вполне убедительным этот переход от качественных характеров к качественным состояниям: почему иметь определенный качественный характер, находясь в том или ином ментальном состоянии, должно означать нахождение в определенном качественном состоянии?
711
N. Block and J. Fodor, ‘What Psychological States Are Not?’, Philosophical Review 81, no. 2, 1972, 159 – 181.
712
